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Introduction 
It is hardly controversial to claim that the United States is the most powerful country 
on the planet. Indeed, it has become remarkably commonplace to observe that 
American power and influence are unprecedented, and that the only parallels for the 
contemporary ‘unipolar’ order are with the Roman Empire (Cox 2003; Wohlforth 
1999). But when set against the global influence of present day America, even  
Roman power looks modest and decidedly regional by comparison. While the 
language used to describe the US’s contemporary dominance of the international 
system can get a little overheated, it is clear that American ‘hyper-power’ is 
unprecedented in its scope and potential impact. As far as other countries and even 
regions of the world are concerned, relations with the US have come to assume an 
unrivalled importance as a consequence. 
 
And yet despite the apparently unambiguous nature of the contemporary American 
ascendancy, it is not without its paradoxes, puzzles and contradictions. For all the 
US’s overwhelming military dominance, for example, it has struggled to impose order 
in Iraq, and cannot unequivocally guarantee security within its own borders. 
Similarly, while US-based corporations bestride the globe and the domestic economy 
accounts for about one third of the world’s economic activity, there are still major 
doubts about the sustainability of private and public debt levels, and concern about 
America’s dependence on continuing inflows of capital from East Asia in particular. 
Even at the level of ‘soft power’,1 or the pervasive - if difficult to quantify - influence 
of ‘American values’ and ‘life-styles’, perceptions of the US have generated  a 
widespread backlash, especially in Islamic societies,  and a reassertion of local 
identity in opposition to an American influence that is seen as corrosive and negative 
(Barber 2001). 
 
One of the reasons it is difficult to gauge the potential impact of American power is 
that it is multifaceted; much depends on the issue area, and the specific basis of 
American influence. Plainly, US military power is quite different in terms of its 
operation and impact than, say, America’s influence over increasingly important 
                                                 
1 The idea of soft power, or the benefits that accrue from non-material, ideational and cultural 
influences has been developed most fully by Nye (2002). 
 2
intergovernmental organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
have become such prominent players in the management of the international 
economic system. The possibility that American power and influence have different 
bases (and may operate in different ways as a consequence) helps to explain the 
variety of different theoretical perspectives that are employed to explain it. While the 
dominant theoretical models – realism, liberalism, Marxism and constructivism – may  
generally pre-date America’s recent ascendancy, they have all been deployed in an 
effort to make sense of the contemporary era which seems to have such unique 
qualities. Consequently, the American ascendancy is as much a test of the efficacy of 
various theoretical frameworks as it is of our capacity to unpack and gauge the 
empirical manifestations of the new order. 
 
This chapter critically assesses some of the most influential theoretical perspectives 
that have attempted to make sense of American dominance. Before embarking on this 
undertaking, however, I briefly review the current debate about the status of the 
evolving international order. Has the US become an imperial power, as much of the 
current literature would suggest, or is it more useful to describe America’s position as 
‘hegemonic’, as I argue? The key argument I make is that the complex, 
multidimensional nature of American hegemony means that its effect and nature 
varies across, time, space and issue areas, making it difficult for any single paradigm 
to capture its full impact. Consequently, I argue in the final section that we need to 
adopt an eclectic approach to theory. 
 
Empire vs. hegemony 
 
When so many observers routinely compare the US’s current position with that of 
Rome’s, it is unsurprising that American power should also be described as imperial. 
What is more surprising, perhaps, is that for some observers at least,  this is a positive 
development. For generations of radicals, ‘American imperialism’ was a synonym for 
a range political, economic and military relations which they  saw as exploitative, 
repressive and responsible for many of the ills of the world - particularly the third 
world. The picture now, however, looks rather different. Many of the neoconservative 
figures that have exerted such a powerful influence on American foreign policy under 
the administration of George W Bush are unabashed advocates of American 
imperialism, which they see as benevolent and ‘good for a vast portion of the world’s 
population’ (Kagan 1998: 26).2  
 
Before we can assess the merits of such claims, it is helpful to clarify what exactly 
imperialism might mean at the present juncture, and whether it is the best way of 
describing the US’s contemporary preeminence. It is worth remembering that some of 
the most influential theories of imperialism were developed by Marxist scholars (see 
Brewer 1990 [1980]), and their preoccupation with economic relations highlights a 
potentially important element of any imperial relationship. It is not necessary to 
subscribe to conspiracy theories or one-dimensional caricatures which claim that 
current American policy is ‘all about oil’ (Klare 2003), to recognize that the Middle 
East does have a significance that is as much geophysical as it is geopolitical. The 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed discussion of the emergence and influence of the ‘neocons’ see Beeson (2004). 
The subsequent discussion draws heavily on this paper. 
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theoretical question to ask is whether the US’s relationship with the region generally 
and with Iraq in particular can usefully be characterized as imperial. 
 
Rather than comparing American power with Rome, I think it makes more sense to 
contrast it with the European imperial experience, especially in the nineteenth 
century. It was this period, after all, which inaugurated the contemporary ‘global’ era 
and the patterns of structured relationships that persist to this day (Hirst and 
Thompson 1996). The dynamics of European imperialism are complex and continue 
to be debated, but the expansion of capitalism into Africa, the Americas and Asia 
clearly marked the high-water mark of European power and influence. Crucially, this 
period helped establish the nation state and the market economy as the defining 
structures of the contemporary global order. While inter-imperial rivalries amongst 
the European powers may have provided  significant ‘push’ factors, the pursuit of new 
markets, resources and labour created a compelling ‘pull’. This basic interaction 
between the developed economies of Western Europe and their far-flung imperial 
possessions entrenched the classic colonial relationship between ‘core’ and 
‘periphery’ (Hobsbawm 1987; Chase-Dunn 1998). The defining characteristic of this 
relationship, and the factor that raises troubling normative and administrative 
questions, is that it occurs between ‘unequal nations which involve effective 
subjugation, [and] the actual exercise of influence over behavior’ (Cohen 1974: 15, 
emphasis in original). 
 
One of the key distinguishing characteristics of an imperial relationship, then, is not 
just that it predicated on a fundamental inequality of power and influence, but that 
there will be ‘direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre’ 
(Watson 1992: 16). In the heyday of European imperialism, what Abernethy (2000: 
12-22) calls the ‘triple assault’ of European power, in which a combination of 
imperial states, the private sector and the church undercut existent patterns of 
governance, economic organization and identity in the periphery, effectively paved 
the way for the European domination and political control of the colonies that became 
the ‘core feature’ of imperialism. The contrast with the US’s position in either the 
immediate present or the more distant past is striking:  firstly, there is an inherent, 
historically determined and culturally entrenched aversion to the idea of imperialism 
in the US (Smith 1994); the US actually played a prominent role in accelerating the 
departure of the former European colonial powers in Southeast Asia (McMahon 
1999). Indeed, the US’s conduct toward its own principal colony – the Philippines – 
provides a revealing insight into the nature of American as opposed to European 
power:  at one level, when the US granted independence to the Philippines in 1946, it 
marked the first example of Western decolonization in the post-war Asia-Pacific. At 
another level, however, the complex web of economic, political and security 
relationships that have bound the Philippines to the US (see Hutchcroft 1998), 
illustrate the very different nature of American power and its operation in the 
contemporary international system  – prior to the current Bush administration, at least.  
 
Consequently, America’s colonial relationship with the Philippines highlights a 
broader point: American power in the post-war period has not been exercised directly 
in the manner of the European colonial powers, but has generally been meditated by 
and diffused through an array of intervening, nominally independent, institutions. 
This is not to say that the US has not exerted a powerful influence of the course of 
economic and political development in the Philippines. On the contrary, it has. But it 
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has done so not through the auspices of viceroys, consuls or governors general, but 
through the more diffuse mechanisms of the international political-economy and a 
system of strategic alliances and security relations that vest formal authority and 
autonomy in sovereign states. In short, American power has been hegemonic, rather 
than imperial. 
 
Before saying anything about the way hegemony (as opposed to imperialism) actually 
operates, it is important to note the historical context within which both modes of rule 
have unfolded. It is no coincidence that the high point of imperial rule occurred in the 
nineteenth century, when the expansion of direct rule and the concomitant control of 
key economic resources that this facilitated had a certain ineluctable logic. A number 
of factors – the dangers of inter-imperial conflict, the emergence of new forms of 
economic domination and control, and the profound ideational transformation that has 
rendered imperialism illegitimate – have fundamentally undercut the logic of 
territorial expansion. This transformation is captured in the rise of the ‘trading state’, 
which eschews military might in favor of commercial power and which – for a 
moment, at least - seemed the quintessential expression of the new global capitalist 
order (Rosecrance 1986). Although military power remains a critical element of 
American power and influence, especially under the present Bush regime, Giovanni 
Arrighi identifies something important about the underlying logics that have 
historically informed state actions in the twentieth century in particular: 
 
Territorialist rulers identify power with the extent and populousness of their domains, and 
conceive of wealth/capital as a means or by-product of the pursuit of territorial expansion. 
Capitalist rulers, in contrast, identify power with the extent of their command over scarce 
resources and consider territorial acquisitions as a means and a by-product of the 
accumulation of capital (Arrighi 1994: 33). 
 
Despite the significance some observers have attached to Iraq’s geo-strategic position 
as source of cheap energy supplies (Mann 2003), the Iraqi adventure is something of 
an anomaly and may yet prove to be the exception rather than the rule. For all 
America’s overwhelming military dominance – especially since the end of the Cold 
War – American policymakers have generally subscribed to a ‘capitalist’, as opposed 
to a ‘territorialist’ logic, preferring to shape an economic order in which US-based 
companies and economic entities can expand and compete off-shore, rather than 
directly seeking to control foreign territory and resources. Indeed, it is significant that 
in the 1990s, the economic and strategic elements of American foreign policy became 
more discrete as the strategic imperative appeared to decline and economic 
competition became the primary preoccupation of policy-makers everywhere 
(Mastanduno 1998). In this regard, it is important to note that in the post S11 
environment, the former pattern of relations in which the economic and security 
elements of  American foreign policy are intended to ‘reinforce each other in a 
mutually beneficial way’ has been largely reinstated (Lake 1999: 186). Indeed, the 
distinctive feature of the current Bush administration may have been to securitize 
America’s economic and foreign policies in a manner that has not been seen since the 
height of the Cold War (Higgott 2004). 
 
It is possible to identify a number of different foreign policy traditions in the US 
(Mead 2001). When combined with competing domestic influences (Trubowitz 1998), 
this means that policy will always be subject to change and revision. Yet the US’s 
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current, structurally embedded position, in which it accounts for a about a third of 
global GDP and an even larger proportion of spending on defence (Economist 2002),  
means that engagement with the world is simply unavoidable. Isolationism is simply 
not an option. The only issue is about the manner of this engagement. Even if it is 
accepted that hegemony is potentially a better way of conceptualizing America’s 
preeminent position, it is clear that there are significantly different elements to this 
dominance. Most fundamentally, military power may operate and be utilized in very 
different ways to economic and political influence. In order to try and make sense of 
these distinctive, albeit increasingly reconnected areas of activity, we need to consider 
the way that the idea of hegemony itself has been seen from a variety of theoretical 
viewpoints. 
 
Theorizing hegemony 
 
The word hegemony is of Greek origin and originally referred to the dominance of 
one state over others in the international system. While this might seen an 
unremarkable idea, as we shall see, not all those who now employ the term think that 
this state-centric focus is any longer useful or appropriate. As I suggested earlier, one 
of the distinguishing characteristics of American hegemony has been the ability of 
policymakers in the US to pursue ‘American interests’ through a variety of indirect 
means, either through the auspices of formally independent intergovernmental 
organisations like the IMF and the WTO, or by helping to establish the ‘rules of the 
game’ that govern international commerce in ways that are judged to favour 
American-based economic interests and actors (Beeson and Bell forthcoming).  
 
At one level this reflects the bifurcation between security and political-economic 
issues noted above. But even in a more narrowly demarcated security sphere, 
American strategic policy is not solely reliant on the direct application of military 
power to achieve particular goals. American’s relationship with Japan, for example, 
provides a powerful illustration of the way generations of Japanese policymakers have 
been influenced by an array of underlying cultural and normative influences that have 
shaped policy outcomes in ways that transcend simple state-to-state relations or 
formal diplomatic practice (Green 2001; Katzenstein 1996). Indeed, the way 
American policymakers approached the countries of East Asia in the post-war period, 
and their concomitant preference for a bilateral regional security architecture centred 
on Washington, reflects a range of normative and cultural assumptions that did not 
apply to the US’s relations with Europe (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Such initial 
observations serve to alert us to the possibility that American power may operate in 
different ways, at different levels, depending on the different issue areas involved. 
The particular issues we choose to focus upon, combined with the theoretical lenses 
through which we examine them, help to account for the very different conclusions 
observers come to about the nature and impact of American power.  
 
Realism 
 
The most enduring tradition of scholarship seeking to explain international relations 
in general and hegemony in particular is, of course, realism. The major assumptions 
of realist scholarship are sufficiently well known to need no rehearsal here (see, for 
example, Morgenthau 1972 [1948]), but it is important to acknowledge that for all its 
much-criticized methodological simplifications and shortcomings, it remains both a 
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powerful influence on the both the conduct of, and (especially in the US) thinking 
about, America’s  international relations (Smith 2002). Moreover,  at this historical 
juncture, when security concerns are privileged above all else, it is a potentially 
important part of an explanation of American foreign policy . 
 
The economist Charles Kindleberger was largely responsible for reviving interest in 
the concept of hegemony during the 1970s. Despite the fact that, as we shall see,  
some of Kindleberger’s ideas have a distinctly ‘liberal’ quality, he is usually placed in 
the neo-realist camp (Hay 2002: 21), mainly  because of his claim that it was 
necessary for the dominant country of an era to ‘set the standard of conduct for other 
countries’, thus overcoming the pitfalls of anarchy and the potentially destructive 
pursuit of narrow national interests (Kindleberger 1973: 28). It was the failure of the 
US to assume this hegemonic or leadership role in the inter-war period that caused the 
catastrophic economic collapse of the 1930s, according to Kindleberger. One of the 
things that sets Kindelberger apart from more orthodox realists with political science 
backgrounds, is his belief that hegemonic leadership can produce a positive sum game 
in which all benefit from trade-led economic expansion.  
 
Conventional realists, by contrast, are famously pessimistic about the nature of 
international relations. This explains the preoccupation with relative gains and the fear 
that other countries economic development is potentially alarming rather than 
mutually uplifting. As Samuel Huntington succinctly points out, economists are ‘out 
in left field’, theoretically speaking, ‘because they are blind to the fact that economic 
activity is a source of power as well as well-being’ (Huntington 1993: 72). In the zero 
sum universe inhabited by realists, economic power is a critical determinant of 
relative state power. Consequently, the rise of Japan, according to Huntington (1993: 
72), was something ‘Americans have every reason to be concerned about’. More 
recently, other realist scholars have expressed similar alarm about the rise of China, 
leading one noted realist to argue that ‘the United States has a profound interest in 
seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead’ (Mearsheimer 
2001: 402).  While this marks a welcome recognition of the importance of economic 
power, it is remarkably pessimistic and, as we shall see, sharply at odds with liberal 
understandings of economic development and integration. The importance of realist 
readings of economic development in the context of this discussion lies in its potential 
influence on policy: the long-standing desire to ‘contain’ China, for example, is 
clearly driven by realist assumptions about the inevitability of conflict as a 
consequence of changes in the distribution of economic weight and power. 
 
Such assumptions are prominent in the work of Robert Gilpin, one of the most 
influential theorists in the realist camp, and one who takes the economic dimension of 
international dominance and competition seriously. In Gilpin’s (1987; 1981) view, the 
international system is characterized by competition between the major powers of a 
particular era as they seek to dominate their rivals and impose their preferred vision of 
international order; a vision that reflects national interests, but which may produce 
stability until the hegemon’s position is inevitably challenged by a new rising power. 
In this regard, hegemonic powers are victims of their own success: the provision of 
the public goods they underwrite may benefit them, but it also benefits rivals and 
brings about a redistribution of power in  the international system. The international 
system is consequently characterized by inevitable cyclical competition that is the 
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product of underlying transformations of material power and control of key, leading-
edge technologies (see Schwartz 1994; Goldstein 1988). 
 
Whatever one may think of the implicit teleology of such analyses and the relative 
neglect of non-material factors in determining influence in the international system,3 
the military and technological preeminence that the US currently enjoys is plainly a 
crucial part of its dominance of the international system (Posen 2003; Wohlforth 
2002). Given that the neoconservative advisors that have influenced policy under the 
Bush administration are ‘realists to the core’ (Lieven 2002), it is perhaps unsurprising 
that American foreign policy should have assumed a more unilateral and militarized 
form. The key point to stress is that, the logic of the ‘neocon’ approach flows directly 
from a realist reading of international system and America’s place in it. Consequently, 
the policies it generates are not only applicable to Iraq.  
 
Although the application of policy may be  different, the same rationale informs 
policy prescriptions toward China and the desire to inhibit its growth and potential for 
hegemonic rivalry for as long as possible (Mearsheimer 2001). Ironically enough, 
however, a thoroughgoing realist reading of US-China relations suggests that it might 
be too late: China’s economic expansion has already established a mutual 
interdependency with the US in which China recycles its massive trade surplus to buy 
American debt (Goodman 2003). Neither side can easily disentangle itself from this 
mutually beneficial nexus of interdependency. Unlike Britain in the nineteenth 
century, America’s position as a net importer of capital severely constrains its 
potential foreign policy leverage (Ferguson 2002). For all its apparent might and 
dominance, therefore, a realist reading of American hegemony suggests that there are 
structurally embedded economic weaknesses in the American position which threaten 
to undermine its long-term position and make Iraq-style adventures simply 
unsupportable (Ferguson and Kotlikoff 2003). 
 
Liberalism 
 
The sort of transnational economic engagement that increasingly characterizes US-
Asia relations is generally seen as a ‘good thing’ by liberals, an inevitable corollary of 
greater interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977), and a potential constraint on 
military conflict (Russett 1995). Although there are some important distinctions 
between different strands of liberal thought, especially its economic and political 
variants, the key point to emphasize, as Richardson (2001: 9) reminds us, is that 
liberals in the US invariably ‘assume that liberal norms and institutions are essentially 
benign and conducive to the good of peoples throughout the world’. This underlying 
assumption about the rectitude and potentially universal appeal of liberal ideas has 
provided a major impetus for the promotion of a particular world order in the period 
since the end of World War II, when America assumed a dominant, not to say, 
hegemonic position. Part of this dominance, as far as liberals are concerned, is derived 
from the inherently attractive nature of American values and the concomitant ability 
to ‘set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others’ (Nye 2002: 
9). While it is difficult to quantify - and easy to overestimate - the impact of ‘soft 
power’, ‘America’ plainly was, and is an attractive idea for many outside the US, 
creating a potentially important source of influence for American policymakers and 
                                                 
3 The nature of the ‘international system’ is taken up in more detail in the final section. 
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economic elites. It is an indictment of contemporary policy that attitudes toward the 
US have changed so dramatically (Sardar and Davies 2002), and a tacit indicator of 
the declining influence of liberal ideas in American policy-making circles (Higgott 
2004). 
 
Yet, for much of the Cold War period, liberal ideas were the normative and 
programmatic bedrock of American foreign policy. The story of the creation of the 
post-war order and the distinctive array of institutions that emerged to govern 
increasingly transnational economic activities and entrench specific security relations 
is well known and has been detailed elsewhere (Latham 1997). What merits emphasis 
here is that while liberals tend to focus primarily on the political-economic and 
institutional aspects of hegemonic power (Keohane 1984), the post-war order that the 
US played such a pivotal role in creating has from the outset been profoundly shaped 
by a wider geo-strategic context. Not only did the confrontation with the Soviet Union 
determine the nature of the over-arching security order within which the liberal 
economic order was nested, but the Cold War confrontation effectively reconstituted 
the American state as well (Hogan 1998). In other words, while liberals may be right 
to highlight the distinctive, highly institutionalized nature of the post-war economic 
and political order, it was created within, and largely a response to, an overarching 
bipolar strategic and ideological confrontation. 
 
Paradoxically, the overwhelming material power possessed by both sides meant that 
direct superpower conflict was unthinkable (Mueller 1989). This strategic stand-off 
gave a particular prominence to political and economic factors, and helps explain the 
focus on the institutions of governance that emerged as part of the so-called Bretton 
Woods regime (Eichengreen and Kenen 1994). Arguably the most important and 
persuasive liberal theorist of the distinctive post-war order in which 
intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO have 
assumed such prominent positions is John Ikenberry. Two aspects of Ikenberry’s 
understanding of American hegemony are worth emphasizing. First, and in keeping 
with the realist position, wars and their aftermaths provide moments in which new 
hegemonic orders can be established. Indeed, Ikenberry’s view of change in the 
international system is in accord with the state-centric, cyclical view of Giplin, who 
he cites approvingly. What distinguishes Ikenberry’s position, and this is the second 
point to stress, is that material power is ‘tamed’ within a constitutionalised order 
(Ikenberry 2001b: 29). In this schema, states are bound by the ‘rules of the game’, 
which establish limits to the way states can act legitimately. Significantly, not only 
are these ‘rules’ based on ‘shared agreement’, according to Ikenberry (2001b: 31), but 
they bind the hegemon in ways that reassure other actors. Crucially, not only is the 
rule-governed, institutionalized order able to overcome what realists take to be the 
inescapably anarchical nature of the international system, but it is system from which 
all benefit, creating a degree of path-dependency that only some future major crisis is 
likely to transform (Ikenberry 1998). 
 
As we shall see, there are striking parallels in this vision and the views of some ‘neo-
Gramscian’ and constructivist scholars who are also interested in the role of ideas, 
institutions and power. What generally distinguishes liberals, however, is the 
assumption that the post-war liberal international order which American power has 
underpinned is normatively desirable and benign. There is often little recognition that 
the sorts of ‘neoliberal’, market-oriented policies that have been actively promoted in 
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places like East Asia - where very different economic relationships and structures 
have developed – are not just resented, but expressions of specifically American 
rather than universal interests (see Wade 2001). This is especially important when we 
remember that one of the key claims that Ikenberry makes about the post-war order is 
that its apparent durability is in large part a function of its legitimacy. Now, however, 
when the IFIs and their relationship with the US are the subjects of trenchant criticism 
(Woods 2003), and when American foreign policy is systematically undermining the 
very basis of the multilateral order that was such a distinctive part of the post-war era, 
then even liberals like Ikenberry have questioned whether the specific pattern of 
institutionalized dominance can endure (Ikenberry 2004).  
 
Marxism 
 
While some may think it slightly anachronistic to devote discussion to Marxist 
theories of hegemony, scholars working under this broad rubric have provided some 
of the most important and persuasive accounts of American power. Given the central 
place of historical materialism in Marxist thinking, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
there are some similarities with realist understandings of power. However, it has been 
‘neo-Gramscian’ scholars more influenced by Antonio Gramsci than Karl Marx that 
have provided some of the most innovative and important recent explanations of 
contemporary hegemony.  
 
The most important figure amongst the neo-Gramscians is Robert Cox, whose work 
links the original Marxist preoccupation with modes of production, material 
conditions and class forces, with an interest in ideology and the role of ideas. In a 
seminal article published nearly a quarter of a century ago, Cox (1981) suggested how 
material capabilities, institutions and ideas formed a complex, reciprocal and 
interactive whole, in which institutions provided a way of perpetuating particular 
international orders. Significantly, Cox placed much emphasis on the inter-subjective, 
shared nature of social meaning, in ways that have subsequently been elaborated by 
constructivists and theorists of global governance (see Onuf 1989; Rosenau 1992). 
What distinguished Cox’s Marxist-derived theorization is that ideas are ultimately tied 
to specific historical circumstances and class relations. Hegemony may be about 
material power, as realists claim, it may also depend on institutions for its 
perpetuation, as liberals argue, but as far as Cox is concerned hegemony is ultimately 
about the ideological legitimation of particular class interests. Crucially, however, and 
in striking sympathy with Ikenberry, the dominant state 
 
creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according 
to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or 
states and leading social classes but at the same time offer[ing] some measure or prospect 
of satisfaction to the less powerful (Cox 1987: 7). 
 
Like liberals, therefore, Cox recognizes that for hegemony to be durable there must be 
something in it for the dominated. Unlike liberals, though, the basis of hegemonic 
domination is no longer associated exclusively with a hegemonic state, but with the 
development of a ‘transnational managerial class’ (Cox 1987: 359-60). From the 
perspective of orthodox Marxism, the idea that class structures might become 
transnational  as a consequence of the ‘globalization’ of underlying economic activity 
is perhaps unsurprising (Robinson and Harris 2000). What is more surprising are the 
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implications this may have for the nature of hegemony. Although there is no 
consensus amongst radical scholars about quite what this might mean in the long run, 
the idea that we might be witnessing the emergence of a ‘global state’ and the 
‘unification of core world state functions’ (Shaw 2000: 17), or that we live in an era 
when no state can ‘form the center of an imperialist project’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 
xiv), captures something  about the nature of emerging ‘post-state’ debates to which 
critical scholars have made significant contributions. 
 
One of the great advantages of some of the Marxist-inspired theories of hegemony is 
their potential capacity to escape the ‘territorial trap’, or the preoccupation with 
geographically delimited political boundaries and notions of state sovereignty that are 
central to realism and much liberal thought, too. This is especially the case in the 
international political economy where neoliberal policies and practices have assumed 
a centrality that transcends, and is not exclusively dependent on nation states, for their  
continuing dominance (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). Like liberals, neo-Gramscians 
recognize the importance institutions have in ‘locking-in’ particular ideas and 
practices as part of a constitutionalized world order (Gill 1998). Where they depart 
from liberals, of course, is in their reading of the impact of such practices, which they 
consider inequitable and exploitative. Whether one agrees with this interpretation of 
neolberalism’s impact or not, radical scholarship has cast an illuminating light on the 
evolution of the international political-economy, and the way American-based 
economic interests may benefit from specific transnational regulatory orders. Where 
they are less convincing, is in linking the geo-economic to the geo-strategic. 
 
Stephen Gill’s (2003) analysis of American ‘grand strategy’, for example, suggests 
that it is conducted in coordination with G7 allies, and is the consequence of the 
‘calculated relation of means to the containment of large contradictions’. The nature 
of contemporary American unilateralism clearly present a major problem for this sort 
of claim. Even in the likely event that the unilateral impulse proves unsustainable - for 
the sorts of mundane economic reasons radical scholars have long emphasized 
(Brenner 2002) – the US clearly enjoys a degree of military dominance that allows it 
to act in ways that are simply not possible for any other country (Bacevich 2002). 
Moreover, and problematically, for the radical case, American foreign policy has 
recently had the effect of compromising and diminishing the highly institutionalized 
multilateral system that American-based interests have directly benefited from 
(Johnson 2004).4 In other words, while radical scholars can tell us a great deal about 
how US-based economic interests can benefit form the regulatory regime created 
under the auspices of American hegemony, and about the way in which a 
constitutionalized form of hegemony might actually work, they are less good at 
accounting for the recent securitization of US foreign policy. A similar problem 
confronts constructivists. 
 
Constructivism 
 
Constructivism ‘is about human consciousness and its role in international life’ 
(Ruggie 1998: 856). While this definition has something in common with both liberal 
and Gramscian emphases on the role of ideas, norms and values in shaping the 
                                                 
4 The US’s failure to sign the Kyoto agreement, its opposition to the International Criminal Court, its 
unilateral abrogation of arms control treaties, and the push for bilateral rather than multilateral trade 
agreements are some of the more important examples of this process. 
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behavior of states and other international actors, constructivism pushes the potential 
importance of the ideational a good deal further. According to Alexander Wendt, 
perhaps the most widely known, if not necessarily the most representative  exponent 
of the constructivist position (see Reus-Smit 2002), ‘the most important structures in 
which states are embedded are made of ideas, not material forces. Ideas determine the 
meaning and content of power, the strategies by which states pursue their interests, 
and interests themselves’ (Wendt 1999: 309). The arrow of causation for 
constructivists points in the opposite direction than it does for both realists and 
Marxists, for whom ideas are ultimately epiphenomena and reflective of underlying 
material or structural forces. It is this fundamental  claim about the potential that ideas 
have to determine both interests and the way they are pursued that underpinned 
Ruggie’s seminal insight into the nature of post-war American hegemony. For Ruggie  
what was critical about American power and the distinctive international order it 
helped create ‘was less the fact that of American hegemony that accounts for the 
explosion of multilateral arrangements than it was American hegemony’ (Ruggie 
1993: 568, emphasis in original). Put differently,  America’s overwhelming structural 
power and material assets gave US policymakers the capacity to re-shape the post-war 
order, but the precise form this took reflected particularly American ideas and a 
normative preferences for a liberal, institutionalized and multilateral order. 
 
The potential importance of a constructivist reading of the administration of George 
W Bush is clear. Given the widely noted influence that a relatively small coterie of 
influential neoconservative intellectuals have had on the Bush administration’s 
foreign policy agenda, it is evident that ideas continue to matter (Mann 2004). Indeed, 
the ending of the Cold War, the demise of bipolar confrontation with the Soviet 
Union, and America’s apparently overwhelming material dominance have created a 
space in which ideas may matter more than ever: freed from the constraints of 
superpower confrontation, policymakers have had the opportunity to create policies 
that reflected more narrowly conceived ‘American’ interests – something that 
explains the ascendancy of geo-economics over geopolitics  during the 1990s 
(Luttwak 1998). What is distinctive about the administration of George W Bush, 
however, is the long-standing desire to apply American power unilaterally to create a 
particular form of international order in which the US ‘has the strength and will to 
lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being 
prepared to enforce them’ (Krauthammer 1990-1991: 33). The subsequent retreat 
from multilateralism and the embrace of the doctrine of pre-emption become easier to 
understand in the light of this ideational shift that significantly pre-dates the ‘war on 
terror’. 
 
Thus far there have been surprisingly few constructivist-inspired analyses of the 
evolution of American foreign policy since 9/11. An important exception is Chris 
Reus-Smit’s American Power and World Order, which argues that for American 
hegemony to be sustainable it must be ‘socially embedded’ (Reus-Smit 2004: 6). In 
some ways the approach of constructivists like Reus-Smit is not unlike that of liberals 
and Gramscians, which emphasize the importance of institutionalization and 
ideational legitimacy in effectively constitutionalising specific international orders 
(see Reus-Smit 1999; Gill 1998). What is distinctive and useful about the 
constructivist reading of American foreign policy that Reus-Smit has recently 
developed, however, is the recognition of the socially-constructed nature of effective 
and sustainable hegemony: 
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Hegemony must be seen as a from of social hierarchy, based on status and recognition. It 
must be cemented by generally recognized procedural and substantive norms, and these 
norms must reflect the negotiation of the hegemon’s and other states’ identities and 
interests. Furthermore,  the  hegemon must pursue its interests in a manner consistent with 
these norms, or the legitimacy of its leadership will fast erode. To construct such a 
hegemony in a world as complex as today’s demands a quality of statesmanship as yet 
unapparent in the “gunboat” diplomacy of the Bush administration (Reus-Smit 2004: 
102). 
 
The contrast between the contemporary expression of American hegemony and earlier 
forms is striking, and raises questions about the durability of hegemony under the 
Bush administration given the remarkable rise of anti-Americanism over the past 
couple of years (PRC 2004; Sardar and Davies 2002). Constructivism highlights and 
explains a widely noted paradox of American power (Nye 2002): despite its material 
dominance, American unilateralism and the concomitant decline of legitimacy this 
engenders, significantly raises the transaction costs associated with the pursuit of 
foreign policy goals. The reluctance of key allies to assist the US in its increasingly 
expensive and open-ended adventure in Iraq is perhaps the most telling example of 
this possibility (Gordon and Shapiro 2004). But the Bush administration’s capacity to 
alienate formerly unequivocal allies is not confined to Western Europe; in East Asia, 
too, the consolidation of regional relationships in response to American economic and 
even security policy suggests that the US no longer enjoys either the legitimacy or the 
authority it once did (Beeson 2003b). While this may look like the sort of ‘balancing’ 
realist theory has long-predicted (Waltz 1993), it is important to recognize that it is 
not occurring in a narrowly demarcated security sphere as such analyses might lead us 
to expect. On the contrary, in yet another paradox of American power, the US’s 
military dominance is not only unlikely to directly threaten other democracies and 
allies, but its material ascendancy is being off-set by regional collaboration, non-
cooperation and the construction of ‘counter-hegemonic discourses’ designed to 
question, if not undermine American policy. 
 
Conceptualizing American Hegemony 
 
Trying to make sense of the construction and impact of US foreign policy and the 
more generalized consequences of America’s structural power and cultural influence 
is clearly a complex undertaking. The multi-dimensional nature of ‘America’s’ impact 
on the world suggests that no single paradigm is likely to provide a complete 
explanation of contemporary hegemony. Indeed, as Katzenstein and Okawara 
(2001/02: 154) argue, ‘[t]he complex links between power, interest, and norms defy 
analytical capture by any one paradigm. They are made more intelligible by drawing 
selectively on different paradigms – that is, by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony’. 
The following attempt to conceptualize American hegemony is undertaken in this 
eclectic spirit and, despite the potentially incommensurable nature of the paradigms 
discussed earlier, draws on a number of approaches. The central claim made here is 
that an eclectic approach allows us to gain a clearer understanding of the multifaceted 
temporal and spatial dimensions of American power as it affects multiple arenas. 
 
The major justification for adopting an eclectic approach is derived from the range of 
issue areas affected by the US, and the sheer durability of American power - the 
declinist literature of the 1980s and early 1990s notwithstanding (see Keohane 1984; 
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Kennedy 1989). While both Marxists and liberals may be right to point to potential 
economic vulnerabilities on the one hand (Brenner 2002), or the declining efficacy of 
America’s ideational influence on the other (Nye 2002-03), the military dominance 
realists emphasize is not just a critical element of America’s structurally-embedded 
paramountcy, it allows the US to behave in ways that are simply impossible for any 
other nation. The point to emphasize at this stage is that the efficacy and importance 
of military (or any other form of) power varies as a consequence of the historically 
specific geo-political context in which it unfolds on the one hand, and the policy 
priorities of a particular regime on the other. This dialectical interaction between 
domestic factors and the US’s hegemonic role exerts a powerful influence over the 
international system within which American power is embedded. 
 
Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2000) have usefully suggested that the international 
system is constituted by a dynamic interaction between military, political, economic 
and societal sectors. In light of the earlier review of theories of hegemony, it is useful 
to consider the nature of American hegemony in these four contexts, in order to 
develop both a clearer understanding of the nature, extent and efficacy of American 
power in the contemporary period, as well a sense of the relative usefulness of the 
various theories of hegemony. 
 
Military power 
One of the most distinctive aspects of America’s strategic position is its 
unprecedented global reach, and the huge lead the US enjoys in terms of technological 
sophistication and military hardware. Realists rightly draw attention to the importance 
of strategic considerations in understanding American dominance: American 
hegemony was initiated by the Second World War, and the distinctive liberal order 
that US hegemony helped to create in its aftermath occurred within the overarching 
context of the Cold War. Consequently, two temporal considerations are especially 
germane here: first, American actions, especially during the early phases of the Cold 
War (as both liberals and Gramscians point out), enjoyed a good deal of legitimacy – 
at least amongst key allies. In other words, the specific geo-political dynamics of the 
Cold War constrained and gave a particular direction to American grand strategy, one 
that is strikingly different to the contemporary period. This leads to a second point: 
despite the ending of the Cold War and the beginning of an era of ‘unipolarity’, there 
has been little winding back of the spatial distribution or reach of American military 
power. On the contrary, what Chalmers Johnson (2004) describes as an ‘empire of 
bases’ has become a permanent, highly institutionalized part of America’s overall 
strategic position.5  
 
One of the continuities of American hegemony, then, has been an accelerating pursuit 
of military dominance and what Bacevich (2002: 49) has described as the increasing 
militarization of foreign policy. The actions of the present Bush administration have 
dramatically highlighted the continuing importance of America’s military power, and 
provided a telling reminder about the importance of agency: the doctrine of pre-
emption and the willingness to act unilaterally are distinctive qualities of the Bush 
administration and testimony to the ideational impact of the ‘neo-con’ advisors that 
have assumed prominent positions in the Bush administration (Mann 2004). The Bush 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that at the time of writing, the US has foreshadowed  a major redeployment of 
American forces with major reductions in Europe and East Asia. 
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administration also highlights the way military and economic interests can intersect 
within a particular administration to shape policy outcomes (Phillips 2004). 
Consequently, as observers like Bacevich and former National Security Advisor to the 
Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski, point out, America’s promotion of global 
economic liberalism and pursuit of military domination are deeply inter-linked 
elements of the US’s overall hegemonic position. Crucially, however, even arch 
realists like Brzezinski (2004: 143) recognize that without legitimacy both the 
application of military power and the larger project of liberal globalization are 
imperiled. 
 
Before considering this ideational dimension of American power, it is useful to 
highlight briefly America’s evolving strategic relationship with East Asia, which is 
considered in more detail elsewhere in this volume. While it is plain that American’s 
role in the Cold War, especially in Korea and Vietnam, profoundly affected political, 
economic and strategic development within East Asia, and the nature of intra-regional 
relations, too (Cumings 1997), it is also clear that this is not simply a structurally-
determined function of the international order. Not only have American attitudes 
toward security issues in East Asia been sharply different to those in Western Europe 
(Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002), but East Asians also have distinctive views about 
security issues that may ultimately place them at odds with the US. On the one hand, 
the distinctive, more all-encompassing notions of security that prevail in East Asia are 
unlike those that prevail in ‘the west’ (Alagappa 1998); on the other, it has been 
argued that the historical  basis of international relations in East Asia has also been 
very different from the Western European model that has provided the basis for most 
contemporary intentional relations theory.  As David Kang (2003) points out, the 
traditional China-centric order in East Asia was the exact opposite of what western 
international relations theory would lead us to expect, and characterized by informal 
inequality overlaid by formal hierarchy. It is not necessary to think that East Asia is 
inevitably reverting to this long-standing ‘natural’ order to recognize that the 
seemingly inexorable rise of China in combination with a decline in American 
legitimacy creates a new, unpredictable environment, which our current theoretical 
models may find difficult to explain. While realism rightly highlights the continuing 
importance of American military power generally, and of its direct strategic 
engagement with and presence in East Asia in particular, the key point to stress is that 
there is nothing inevitable about the way this engagement will play out or the way 
East Asia will respond to it. Indeed, there is evidence of an emerging normative or 
ideational shift in East Asia which may presage a major reorientation in the region’s 
strategic posture and its relations with the US (Alagappa 2003). 
 
Political-economy and hegemony 
Although Buzan and Little suggest that the political and economic spheres are distinct 
and should be considered separately, the nature of the contemporary international 
system generally and the impact of American hegemony in particular make this a 
somewhat artificial distinction. The idea that politics and economics are inseparable, 
mutually constitutive parts of larger social realities is well established (Polyani 1957; 
Strange 1994); the challenge now is construct conceptual frameworks that capture the 
nature of this interaction at both a national and transnational level, while 
simultaneously paying attention to the wider geopolitical context within which such 
interactions occur. 
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The potential importance of this claim can be seen in the context of East Asia and its 
interaction with the US. East Asia is characterized by famously (or infamously) close 
relations between government and business, which highlight just how artificial the 
attempted analytical separation of politics and economics actually is. However, the 
salient point here is that institutions like the ‘developmental state’, which Japan 
pioneered and which has been widely emulated to varying degrees across the region, 
are unlikely to have prospered in quite the way they did without the Cold War and the 
particular strategic priorities adopted by the Americans (Beeson forthcoming). Not 
only did the US adopt a more tolerant attitude toward mercantilist, statist practices of 
which American policymakers had little sympathy, but the creation of a liberal, 
dynamic international economy provided the opportunity for much of the region to 
develop through export-oriented industrialization. 
 
Adopting a more temporally and spatially-informed approach to both the international 
political economy and the impact of American hegemony upon it has a number of 
advantages. First, it highlights both the way in which international economic 
restructuring has brought about a change in both the way  economic activity is 
organized and coordinated (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995), and the diversity and 
influence of private sector actors in the regulation of the contemporary international 
system (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). One of the most important consequences of 
the evolving relationship between political and economic power is its increased 
transnationalisation and the subsequent erosion of the link between geographically 
demarcated, immobile political communities of fate, and potentially mobile economic 
actors. In short, power is not exclusively political, nor is it coterminous with national 
boundaries (Agnew 2002). Some observers contend that the globalization of 
economic – and by necessity, political – activity is generating changes ‘comparable in 
scope to the transition from the feudal epoch to the modern Westphalian system’ 
(Korbin 2002: 43). What is clear, is that international restructuring is changing the 
way economic activity is organized, and the power of states relative to economic 
actors. While there is a major debate about just how far this process has gone,6 and 
major differences in the capacities of individual states, it is clear that  the private 
sector is taking increasing responsibility for making authoritative decisions and 
influencing policy across an array of areas that were formerly the preserve of states 
(Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999). 
 
The second advantage of taking history and geography seriously, then, is that it alerts 
us to the differential impact of a range of processes that are associated with and driven 
by American power or, more accurately, by specific interests that are able to shape US 
foreign and economic policy at particular moments. Marxists, or radical scholars more 
generally, have gone furthest in developing a framework that attempts to explain the 
way that the transnational economic restructuring has led to a concomitant 
transnationalisation of political power of class forces (Cox 1987; Robinson and Harris 
2000). Despite the fact that such analyses generally understate the wider geopolitical 
and strategic contexts within which such relationships operate, they do highlight 
something important about the way particular interests can shape policy and about the 
significance about ideational or ideological legitimacy in underpinning a particular 
order. The influence of financial sector interests over recent American policy in East 
                                                 
6 There is an extensive literature which considers the role of the state and the possible impact of 
‘gobalisation’.  
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Asia, which continued to lobby for further liberalization despite accumulating 
evidence of its negative and destabilizing impact, is a telling example of the first 
possibility (Beeson 2003a). Similarly, the systematic discursive demolition of the 
legitimacy of the Asian developmental state undertaken in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis illustrates how predominantly US-based economic interests and ideas 
were mobilized to marginalize Asian alternatives to the dominant neoliberal American 
model (Hall 2003).  
 
The precise way that ‘American power’ has been exercised in the international 
political-economy has, therefore, varied over time, reflecting both the constraints of 
geopolitics, the fluctuating influence of particular economic interests, and the position 
of the IFIs, which have been such an important part in promoting and enforcing 
neoliberalism. What is most striking at present, however, is that the renewed emphasis 
on security issues post-S11 has changed both American foreign policy and its impact 
on the rest of the world. In Southeast Asia, which it is supposedly at the forefront of 
the ‘war on terror’, strategic cooperation is becoming a prerequisite of economic aid 
and trade and reconfiguring inter-state and domestic relations across the region as a 
consequence (Beeson 2004). But if there are echoes of the Cold War in contemporary 
policy, there are also important differences that highlight the ambiguous position the 
US occupies at the center of the international system. 
 
Socio-cultural hegemony? 
The final7 element of Buzan and Little’s depiction of the international system is the 
societal or socio-cultural sector.  Assessing the impact of something as imprecise as 
‘culture’ is inevitably fraught, but it does highlight another potentially important, if 
contradictory impact of American power.  
 
At one level there is clearly a significant overlap with both liberal and Gramscian 
scholars who emphasize the importance of ‘soft power’ and/or ideology in  promoting 
a particular world view or in constitutionalizing a specific set of norms and values 
(Nye 2002; Gill 1998). At another level, however, arguments about the potential 
impact of ‘cultural’ influences can be far grander and all-encompassing, and involve 
claims that are either insupportably teleological at worst or highly Eurocentric at best 
(Fukuyama 1992; von Laue 1987). While such claims may look wildly overblown and 
neglect the actual history of technological and economic development in which East 
Asia played such a prominent part (Hobson 2004), ‘the West’ generally and the US in 
particular clearly have had a disproportionate influence over the course of recent 
history and the development of the international system. Indeed, it is precisely as a 
consequence of this influence and the US's unique capacity to affect the evolution of 
processes associated with globalization that leads Ikenberry to argue that the US 
ought to be uniquely qualified and positioned to take advantage of the very system it 
helped to create (Ikenberry 2001a).   
 
And yet for all the attention that is paid to the US’s dominance of the information and 
entertainment sectors of the international economy, it is evident that not only is this 
cultural hegemony frequently resented, but it’s impact is at best incomplete (Barber 
2001; PRC 2004). Consequently, it may be more useful to speak of world culture as a 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that in Buzan and Little’s original formulation they also included the 
environmental sector, but a consideration of its significance is beyond the scope of this chapter and the 
competence of its author. 
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specific repertoire of institutions, practices and purposes generated and sustained by 
states and social systems (Boli and Thomas 1999). Such a formulation usefully directs 
our attention toward the complex, multi-level, multi-actor nature of contemporary 
processes of ‘global governance’. What we need to add to these approaches, however, 
and what emerges from a consideration of the US’s specific historical role in the 
development of such a system, is that hegemonic power continues to exert a powerful, 
sometimes decisive force on the evolving international order. This is most 
dramatically obvious, of course, in the security sphere, and exemplified by the US’s 
present doctrine of preemption. It is also important to recognize that the US can exert 
a more pervasive, comparatively subtle long-term influence at this more diffuse 
cultural level as it encourages the adoption of a particular set of economic practices. 
The persistence of varieties of capitalism should not blind us to the fact that, as Susan 
Strange (Strange 1997) pointed out, the differences in broadly capitalist orders are 
less significant than the similarities. The importance of this insight is confirmed by 
China’s accession to the WTO (Fewsmith 2001): the capitulation of the last 
significant alternative to the ubiquitous capitalist model is arguably as significant as 
the ending of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union.8 It is an event that the 
US was significantly responsible for, and from which it stands to gain enormously at a 
strategic, economic, political and ideational level. One of the most important 
manifestations of  cultural hegemony is in bringing about these sorts of  long-term 
changes in the underlying assumptions that political elites have about the most 
appropriate way of organizing economic – and by implication – social activity. This 
more diffuse, subtle and long-term consequence of American hegemony has been one 
of its most important. Remarkably, the recent emphasis on material power at both a 
theoretical and policy level means it is also one of the most under-appreciated. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The potential importance of America’s ideational influence and  legitimacy, as well as 
the limits of material power, are clearly observable in Iraq. Realists may be able to 
explain why the US can act preemptively and win a rapid military victory, but they 
are less good at explaining why the Bush administration might want to invade Iraq in 
the first place, or why they are having such a difficult time suppressing opposition to 
their presence. They are also less convincing in accounting for the responses to 
American unilateralism. In Europe and East Asia there are signs of growing unease 
about American policy, and an erosion of American authority as a consequence 
(Daalder 2003; Beeson 2003b).  
 
To understand why US policy is increasingly seen as illegitimate, frequently 
contested, and arguably far less effective than it once was, we need to recognize how 
it has evolved over the last fifty years or so. Seen in a longer time-frame, the extent of 
the transformation that has occurred under the Bush administration becomes clearer – 
but so do some continuities. True, unilateralism, preemption and a preference for 
military rather than diplomatic solutions to difficult international issues are distinctive 
qualities of the present administration. But the structurally embedded influence that 
flows from American military power, economic weight and political leverage are 
                                                 
8 It is important to recognise the extent of the changes China’s admission to the WTO implies, 
including re-writing the national constition to accommodate the requirements of market-centred 
economic actitivty. See, Fewsmith (2001). 
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factors that pre-date this administration, as is the commitment to liberalism and 
openness that characterized earlier administrations (Bacevich 2002).  
 
To capture the complex reality that is American hegemony we need to adopt an 
eclectic approach that draws on and synthesizes a number of approaches and 
theoretical frameworks. In so doing we can begin to recognize how American 
hegemony has evolved, its differential impact in various parts of the world, and the 
contingent interaction between the domestic and international aspects of American 
policy. Such an analysis serves as a powerful reminder of one other aspect of 
American power that is especially germane to a collection like this: it makes a 
difference who runs America. Whatever we may think of the Bush administration and 
its impact on Asia in particular, it serves as a salutary reminder that agency continues 
to matter, and the hegemonic potential can be realized in distinctive and sometimes 
troubling ways. 
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